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Measuring and Explaining Pension System Risk 
Abstract 
We discuss pension system risk in the United States by focusing on the investment policy and the 
methodology for the valuation of the liabilities of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). We 
offer suggestions as to how the PBGC should consider modifying the Pension Insurance Modeling 
System. The issues of investment policy and liability valuation are not two distinct topics. As emphasized 
here, the proper valuation of liabilities provides a benchmark for the PBGC to use as a starting point for 
the establishment of its investment policy and then for assessing investment performance. 
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Measuring and Explaining Pension System Risk 
Frank Fabozzi 
 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss pension system risk in the United States by 
focusing on the investment policy and the methodology for the valuation of the liabilities 
of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Based on this discussion, I offer a 
few suggestions as to how the PBGC should consider modifying the Pension Insurance 
Modeling System (PIMS). The issues of investment policy and liability valuation are not 
two distinct topics. As emphasized here, the proper valuation of liabilities provides a 
benchmark for the PBGC to use as a starting point for the establishment of its investment 
policy and then for assessing investment performance. 
The PBGC can best be described as an insurer with little control over key 
financial decisions that might permit it to increase the likelihood of accomplishing its 
overarching mandate. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), its mission is to preserve defined benefit (DB) plans it insures and protect the 
beneficiaries of those plans. The agency’s inability to employ strategies available to 
private insurers and the influence of political issues associated with decisions made by 
Congress makes the management of the PBGC one of the most challenging tasks faced 
by any financial institution.  
The PBGC has acknowledged that, based on its current funded status and 
investment policy, the probability is high that it will have insufficient funds to pay all 
future benefits due current beneficiaries. For example, as of September 30, 2012, the 
single-employer program deficit was $29.1 billion and the multiemployer programs 
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deficit was $5.2 billion. It will be quite difficult for the PBGC with its current asset 
portfolio as well the premiums expected to be generated, to fully meet its obligations in 
the long run. Moreover, given the methodology for the valuation of liabilities as 
explained below, there is good reason to believe that the program deficits may be 
understated. 
It would seem that a reasonable goal would be to maintain the program as long as 
possible with the hope of eventually putting as small a deficit as possible to the U.S. 
government. Although it is true that the federal government does not stand behind the 
PBGC’s obligations as explicitly stated under ERISA, an April 28, 2008 letter from the 
Congressional Budget Office to Congressman George Miller (Chair of the Committee on 
Education and Labor), states that “an implicit expectation exists among many market 
participants and policymakers that taxpayers will ultimately pay for benefits should 
PBGC be unable to meet those obligations” (CBO 2008). 
Consequently, it is not a surprise that the General Accountability Office (GAO) 
highlighted the PBGC as a “high risk” agency in its report to the U.S. Congress starting 
in 2003. In the GAO’s February 14, 2013 update, the progress made by the PBGC and 
actions by Congress to address the agency’s weaknesses were acknowledged, but the 
GAO concluded: “Because of long-term challenges related to PBGC’s governance and 
funding structure, PBGC’s financial future is uncertain” (GAO 2013: 26). 
The need for a critical review of the PBGC’s investment policy is twofold. First, 
the plan’s investment policy changes periodically. By investment policy, we mean the 
asset allocation among major asset classes (equities, fixed income, real estate, and 
alternative assets such as private equity). Guidance as to the proper asset allocation policy 
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is needed so that those responsible for making that decision — the PBGC’s Board of 
Directors includes the Secretaries of Labor, the Treasury, and Commerce — and those 
responsible for implementing the investment policy in selecting and evaluating the 
performance of asset managers — the staff of the PBGC — will better understand the 
implications of their actions. Moreover, should the PBGC need to obtain external funding 
through the issuance of non-government guaranteed debt, the questions raised here will 
be those that potential investors and credit rating agencies must examine. The major issue 
to be raised by these parties has to do with the agency’s actual deficit. When making their 
estimate of the deficit, they are not likely to use the rules that currently govern the PBGC 
in estimating the value of liabilities. Instead, potential investors and credit rating agencies 
will likely employ a methodology similar to the one described in this paper, rather than 
the methodology used by PIMS. 
In what follows, I first provide some background information and I describe the 
challenges faced by the PBGC. Then I describe the issues associated with liability 
valuation, and two general investment policies that the PBGC has pursued since 1974. 
Next I discuss alternative investment policy strategies along with benchmark construction 
for asset managers engaged by the PBGC. These are also useful in the evaluation of the 
PBGC’s investment policy.  
 
1. Brief Review of PBGC Management Issues 
In this section, I briefly describe the decisions available to the PBGC to mitigate 
the risk of failing to accomplish its mandate. There are two separate insurance programs 
under the PBGC’s purview — single-employer and multiemployer plan insurance 
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programs. For the single-employer plan there is a “revolving fund” and a “trust fund.”  
Because the trust fund for the multiemployer plan ran of funds, there is only a revolving 
trust. 
 
The revolving fund results from premium payments received from sponsors of 
insured plans. It is a budgetary account (i.e., the cash flow appears in the federal budget). 
The revolving fund can only be invested in debt guaranteed by the U.S. government. 
The trust fund, reflecting accumulated assets from terminated plans, is a non-
budgetary account (i.e., the assets from terminated plans are not part of the federal 
budget). The funds must be invested in compliance with the investment policy approved 
by the Secretaries of Labor, Treasury, and Commerce. Although the staff of the PBGC 
does not manage the funds, it does make four critical investment decisions. First, based 
on the PBGC’s investment policy (asset allocation), the staff determines which 
professional asset managers to engage. Second, in the selection of asset managers for 
each asset class, it decides on whether active or passive managers should be engaged. 
Third, the staff determines the benchmarks to be used, and fourth, the staff evaluates 
performance of external managers. 
To meet claims not covered by plan assets or obtained from terminated plan 
sponsors, no funding can be obtained from the federal government. This is because there 
are no appropriations from general revenues to cover any claims. Instead, funding sources 
are limited to investment returns, premiums received, and assets from terminated plans 
taken over by the PBGC. 
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These premiums are established by Congress. In 1974 when ERISA was 
established, the premium was set at $1 per participant for single-employer plans and 
$0.50 per participant for multiemployer plans. The per participant rate has been raised 
over time, and also adjusted for the financial health of the plan as measured by the 
amount of underfunding of the vested plan.  
Liabilities. PBGC’s liabilities must be projected and then valued so that the agency’s 
deficit can be determined. Moreover, and this is critical, the structure of the liabilities will 
need to be determined and integrated into the investment policy. 
Measuring the agency’s liabilities involves projections for current beneficiaries 
whose benefits are covered by the PGBC, and also for beneficiaries whose plans are 
projected to be terminated within the year (probably terminations). For the former, 
standard actuarial models are employed to determine payments. Although there are 
improvements in actuarial modeling, particularly dealing with the treatment of longevity 
risk, this exercise is not as complicated as projecting the claims to be paid to future 
beneficiaries arising from (probably) terminated plans. Unlike a typical insurer that may 
refuse an applicant seeking insurance based its underwriting standards, the PBGC cannot 
make such a business decision. Moreover, such plans often have substantial 
underfunding, resulting in an increase in the PBGC’s deficit. 
One obvious way to reduce the likelihood of receiving assets of terminated 
pension plans is to require one or more of the following: larger contributions, higher 
premiums for underfunded plans, or lower guaranteed payments. But such risk mitigation 
policies are currently unavailable to the PGBC’s management. Unlike an insurer, the first 
 
6 
two can adversely impact the viability of current plans covered by the PBGC, while the 
last is a politically sensitive issue. 
Instead, it seems that the best that can be done is to prepare for the terminated 
plans, working with the sponsors of troubled plans, and, in the case of bankruptcy, 
litigating to obtain recovery of additional assets. These practices are currently being 
pursued. In projecting future financial status, the PBGC uses PIMS to estimate both 
single-employer and multiemployer exposure. The model, discussed in other technical 
panel papers, does not provide one prediction but instead uses simulation to obtain a 
range of possible outcomes. The model continues to be improved. 
Once projections of future liabilities are obtained, the next step is to value those 
liabilities. This is done by discounting the projected liabilities by a suitable set of 
discount rates. What that discount rate or rates should be has been the subject of 
considerable debate, to be reviewed below. Given the importance of liability valuation to 
the design of investment policy, construction of benchmarks given to asset managers, and 
the evaluation of PBGC performance, the topic is not merely a theoretical issue in 
financial economics. 
 
2. The Challenge 
Managing a private insurer is far less challenging than managing the PBGC since the 
former has many tools and much managerial discretion. For instance, private insurers 
have the following: 
1. The ability to set risk-based premiums as determined by its actuaries; 
2. The ability to refuse entities seeking insurance; 
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3. The ability to reinsure to lay off any risk (i.e., can determine what risk to retain 
and which risk to sell off); and 
4. The ability to raise funds in the capital market. 
In contrast, for the PBGC, options are quite different. The agency: 
1. Cannot set its own premiums; 
2. Is required by law to accept qualified defined benefit plans regardless of their 
level of underfunding; 
3. Cannot reinsure, making it difficult to lay off risk; and 
4. Cannot raise funds in the capital market. 
Not only are premium levels under the control of Congress, but also the setting of a 
fair premium could have an adverse impact on system-wide surviving plans, increasing 
their likelihood of being terminated. This is unique to the PBGC as an insurer wherein a 
realistic premium increase could boost underfunding, despite an increase in premium 
income. 
One limitation of both the single-employer and multiemployer PIMS is that they are 
predictive models. In the case of PIMS applied to single-employer plans, there is no 
feedback to deal with possible responses by the corporate management of insured plans 
to changes in PBGC or Congressional policy. The PIMS model designed for the 
multiemployer plans does include the probability that there might be mass withdrawal 
from a given plan or the possibility of plan insolvency before any such mass withdrawal. 
However, from the perspective of an individual employer, the PIMS model does not 
anticipate how individual employers might respond to changes in PBGC or 
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Congressional policy. Accordingly, a longer-term project would develop a model to 
allow for behavioral responses to policy changes. 
 
3. Crucial Role of the Benchmark 
Given these constraints and restrictions on effective management of the PBGC, 
one might think about re-designing its governance structure and investment strategy. 
However, instead we discuss how to create an investment strategy that will improve the 
current investment process, so as to improve the financial health of the PBGC. The 
process for doing so begins with the establishment of the appropriate benchmarks for (1) 
determining the asset allocation policy, and (2) evaluating performance. The critical 
component in this process is the development of a customized benchmark.  
Investment Policy. The agency’s investment policy fundamentally pertains to its asset 
allocation decision. Although there is frequent mention in the PIMS documentation that 
asset allocation is tied to its liability structure, it is unclear how the link is made in PIMS.  
Historically, the agency’s asset association policy has alternated between a 
“maximize long-term returns” and a “liability-driven investment” (LDI) strategy. More 
specifically:  
• From 1974 to 1990, the investment policy was designed to allow for greater 
equity exposure in order to maximize expected returns within acceptable levels of 
risk; 
• From 1990 to 1994, the investment policy was designed primarily to reduce 
balance-sheet volatility that arose from a mismatch between the sensitivity to 
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interest rates changes of the PBGC’s assets and liabilities through greater 
exposure to fixed-income securities with long duration (i.e., LDI strategy);  
• From 1994 to 2004, the investment policy returned to that pursued in 1974 to 
1990, seeking to maximize expected returns within acceptable levels of risk by 
permitting greater exposure to equities; 
• From 2004 to January 2008, there was a return to an investment policy of 
reducing balance-sheet volatility (LDI strategy). The asset allocation policy 
permitted from 15% to 25% of asset exposure to equities and 75% to 85% 
exposure to fixed-income securities; 
• In February 2008 to April 2011, the investment policy shifted to a “45-45-10” 
policy: 45% equities, 45% fixed income, and 10% alternative investments (i.e., 
private equity and real estate). The view in designing this policy was that the 
PBGC should take advantage of its long-term investment horizon and target the 
generation of better returns to provide a greater probability of satisfying its long-
term obligations (i.e., maximize long-term returns strategy); and 
• In May 2011, the PBGC adopted a new policy of targeting 30% equity and other 
non-fixed income assets and 70% fixed income assets. On adopting this policy, 
the Board gave the following reason: “The investment policy objective is to 
maximize total return within a prudent risk framework that incorporates PBGC‘s 
fixed obligations and asset composition of potential trusteed plans” (PBGC 
2012a: 35). That is, it is a return to the LDI strategy. 
It is interesting to note that these policy recommendations have come from external 
advisors, though the recommendations have been evaluated by other government 
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agencies. For example, the 45-45-10 policy adopted in February 2011 which represented 
a major shift in the allocation policy was based on an analysis of the Rocaton Investment 
Advisors. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reviewed the assumptions underlying 
the PBGC’s decision to shift to the 45-45-10 policy and assessed its potential for 
affecting the PBGC’s ability to meet its obligations to retirees and for increasing costs to 
taxpayers. In commenting on the new investment policy to Congressman George Miller, 
Chair of the Committee on Education and Labor in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
the CBO in April 2008 wrote: 
“The new strategy is likely to produce higher returns, on average, over the 
long run. But the new strategy also increases the risk that PBGC will not 
have sufficient assets to cover retirees’ benefit payments when the 
economy and financial markets are weak. By investing a greater share of 
its assets in risky securities, PBGC is more likely to experience a decline 
in the value of its portfolio during an economic downturn—the point at 
which it is most likely to have to assume responsibility for a larger number 
of underfunded pension plans. If interest rates fall at the same time that the 
overall economy and financial markets decline, the present value of 
benefit obligations will increase, and the pension plans likely to be 
assumed by PBGC will be even more underfunded as a result” (CBO 
2008: 2). 
The CBO’s further comments are noteworthy because they highlight the distinction 
between the much-abused principle of portfolio construction using the classical mean-
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variance framework to obtain diversification while ignoring the critical nature of the 
liability structure (i.e., the timing of the obligations). The CBO wrote: 
“It is widely accepted that an investor benefits from having as diversified a 
portfolio as possible, given an established level of risk tolerance. A 
portfolio containing a mixture of risky securities will generally pose less 
risk to an investor than a portfolio consisting of just a single risky asset. 
Most observers would agree that the portion of assets allocated to equities 
and other risky securities should be well-diversified in order to maximize 
return for a given level of risk. 
There is a significant difference, however, between the riskiness of 
PBGC’s asset portfolio and the risk posed by the new investment strategy 
to the corporation’s funded status —the difference between the value of 
PBGC’s assets and the present value of its liabilities. That is, although 
Rocaton’s analysis suggests the new investment strategy offers greater 
expected returns with lower risk to the assets held in PBGC’s portfolio, 
that strategy reduces the timing match between the corporation’s future 
pension obligations and cash-flow streams from its investments. The 
increased risk to funded status is illustrated in principle on page 28 of 
Rocaton’s report in a graphic that is reproduced in this letter (see Figure 
1). In particular, “Alternative #5” (which most closely represents the new 
strategy) is further to the right than the “current target” (which represents 
the recent strategy)” (CBO 2008: 4). 
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Liability valuation. The underlying principle in the valuation of an asset or a liability is 
that it should be discounted at a risk-appropriate interest rate. The rate should be based on 
the rate that can be earned on market-traded investment vehicles.  
If one accepts the notion that a set of liabilities should be valued at the cost 
necessary to defease those liabilities by purchasing a portfolio of risk-free securities, then 
the appropriate investment vehicles are the securities traded in the U.S. Treasury market.1 
Although Treasury securities are not default-free, they are still viewed as the benchmark 
for risk-free rates around the world, as well as providing a liquid market for creating a 
portfolio for defeasing a liability stream. This means that not one or two Treasury coupon 
rates should be used for discounting liabilities, but a set of Treasury spot rates. Spot rates 
are the theoretical rates that the U.S. Department of the Treasury would have to pay if it 
elected to issue zero-coupon Treasury securities with different maturities. There are well-
developed analytical methodologies (e.g., bootstrapping) and econometric techniques for 
deriving theoretical spot rates from Treasury coupon rates. In fact, Treasury spot rates are 
used in arbitrage-free pricing of fixed income cash and derivative instruments.  
The PBGC’s liabilities can be viewed as a yield curve of monthly benefit 
payments. The argument in favor of using Treasury spot rates is that the present value of 
the liabilities represents how much the U.S. Department of the Treasury would have to 
issue in Treasury securities to pay off the projected liabilities. Investors and credit rating 
agencies would view liabilities in the determination of their value.  
1 A long-time proponent of establishing customized benchmarks based on liabilities for 
public and private defined benefit plans, as well as the PBGC is Ronald J. Ryan, CEO 
of Ryan ALM, Inc. See Ryan (forthcoming). 
 
                                                          
13 
How does this compare with the PIMS treatment of the liabilities? In the PBGC’s 
2012 Actuarial Report, the interest rate used as of September 30, 2012 was 3.28% of 
liability obligations for the first 25 years, and 2.97% thereafter. Although the longer-term 
rate is in line with Treasury rates (roughly 2.92% in 2012), the fixed rate for under 25 
years was far greater than for 25-year Treasuries (3.28% versus 2.54%). The difference 
was even greater at the short-end of the yield curve, where 5-year and 10-year Treasuries, 
for example, offered a yield of only 0.76% and 1.8%, respectively.  Consequently, the 
projected liabilities for the first 25 years were considerably undervalued.  
The PBGC report, “FY 2012 PBGC Exposure Report” (PBGC 2012b), prepared 
to satisfy requirements in Section 4008 of ERISA, included an Appendix titled 
“Overview of PIMS.” Here the following statement appeared:  
“Throughout this report, we express all future outcomes in present value 
terms (i.e., discounted back to 2012). Each scenario’s outcomes are 
discounted based on the 30-year Treasury bond yields projected for that 
scenario, regardless of whether the underlying simulated cash flows are 
generated from holdings of equities, high-yield bonds, corporate bonds, or 
U.S. Treasury bonds.” 
Here the same problem arises: by using of a single discount rate rather than a term 
structure of Treasury spot rates, projected liabilities and therefore the deficit are 
underestimated. Given that short-term rates (due to a steep Treasury yield curve) as of 
this writing are far lower than the 30-year Treasury rate used in the simulations by PIMS 
to calculate the present value of liabilities, there is likely to be a considerable 
understatement of the value of the PBGC’s liabilities and deficit. 
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The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), in its Financial Accounting 
Statement (FAS) 87, has explained how to value pension liabilities of plan sponsors. Here 
plan liabilities must be priced as high-quality zero-coupon bonds whose par values match 
the liability payment amounts, and whose maturities match the liability payment dates. 
More precisely, the selection of discount rates is explained in Paragraph 186 of FAS 106 
(December 15, 1990) as follows:  
“The objective of selecting assumed discount rates is to measure the single 
amount that, if invested at the measurement date in a portfolio of high-
quality debt instruments, would provide the necessary future cash flows to 
pay the accumulated benefits when due. Notionally, that single amount, 
the accumulated postretirement benefit obligation, would equal the current 
market value of a portfolio of high-quality zero coupon bonds whose 
maturity dates and amounts would be the same as the timing and amount 
of the expected future benefit payments.” 
Although the FASB refers to pension liabilities of plan sponsors, the valuation is equally 
relevant to the PBGC’s liabilities. 
 Moreover, in a June 1993 letter to corporations, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Guidelines on FAS 87 were set forth as follows:  
“The SEC staff believes that the guidance that is provided in paragraph 
186 of FASB 106, for selecting discount rates to measure the post-
retirement benefit obligation, also is appropriate guidance for measuring 
the pension benefit obligation.” 
The SEC letter states further that:  
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“Rates that cannot be justified or are just too high will be passed on to the 
SEC’s enforcement division for further action. The enforcement division 
could require restatement of the company’s financial statements, as well as 
seek to impose civil or criminal penalties.” 
Apparently the SEC believes that the FASB guidelines are important enough for 
reporting entities to invoke such consequences for failure to comply. 
 While the above arguments about using a term structure of interest rates rest on 
sound principles of valuation, the issue still remains as to what financial instrument 
should be used. The FASB, for example, states in Paragraph 44 of FAS 87:  
“In making those estimates, employers may also look to rates of return on 
high-quality fixed income investments currently available and expected to 
be available during the period to maturity of the pension benefits.” 
It is clear that it should be a high-quality fixed income instrument. I have argued above 
that it should be Treasury rates. Historically, there have been some who have argued that 
the rate on double A (AA or Aa) or triple A (AAA or Aaa) rated corporate bonds should 
be used. The SEC, for example, qualified “high quality” to include corporate bonds with 
those ratings. But there are four problems with using double-A or triple-A rated corporate 
bonds.2 First, these are not viewed as free of default risk. A portion of the yield offered 
on corporate bonds reflects both default risk and liquidity risk. Second, there are major 
problems with corporate bond indices used to represent the corporate AA and AAA 
markets. Third, few corporate bonds are available with a duration in excess of 15 years, 
while pension liabilities are far longer than 15 years. Finally, one of the reasons for using 
2 These problems are discussed further in Ryan and Fabozzi (2003). 
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a term structure to create a portfolio of high-quality fixed income instruments is to 
defease the projected liabilities. Yet the size and liquidity of the AA and AAA rated 
corporate bond market is such that a defeasance is not possible.  
 The PBGC currently discounts its future benefits obligations using an interest rate 
that approximates the discount rate used in the private-sector annuity market. But there 
are several problems with this rate. The rates for the 1-25 and 25 year plus periods reflect 
annuity rates. But annuity rates are not really market rates but individually negotiated 
rates. Consequently, the first problem with annuity rates as candidates for discounting is 
that the same rate is not available to all market participants. Second, there is not a market 
determined set of zero-coupon rates. Third, the annuity providers are subject to default 
risk. Finally, the market may not be large enough to defease the PBGC’s projected 
liabilities. 
Although I have argued that liabilities should be discounted at Treasury spot rates, 
one might argue that the projections for terminated plans as projected by PIMS are not 
known with certainty. As a result, it might be argued that these liabilities might warrant a 
higher discount rate depending on the likelihood associated with the projection. 
Nevertheless, it is crucial for PIMS to include a term structure model for Treasury 
securities and to use the resulting set of rates to discount liabilities. Not only will this 
provide the proper valuation of liabilities and deficit, it is the benchmark that can be used 




4. Proposed Solutions 
This section takes as given that there is no reasonable way to move the PBGC 
from an unhealthy, high-risk agency to a healthy agency. Accordingly, the proposed 
solutions we discuss next seek to minimize the cost of an eventual bailout, should that be 
necessary as determined by Congress.  
 Our solutions do not deal with the strategy of raising premiums or reducing 
benefits, since these are beyond the control of the PBGC. The CBO noted these other 
solutions in the letter to Chairman Miller referred to earlier, writing: 
“The Congress could address the issue of structural underfunding in three ways:  
 Set premiums at a level that will cover expected shortfalls from future claims; 
 Reduce retirees’ benefit payments; or  
 Tighten funding rules for insured plans.” 
In what follows, I focus instead on the investment policy and performance evaluation. 
Investment policy. As explained earlier, the PBGC’s investment policy must take into 
account its liability structure. One approach would construct a portfolio of Treasury 
securities that defease the future liabilities. There are still risks associated with longevity 
risk and uncertainty about future liabilities due to new obligations from bankrupt plans. 
Moreover, as of this writing, the prevailing level of low interest rates makes it difficult to 
support such a proposal. It would be interesting to assess the performance of such an 
investment strategy and compare it to the current funding status of the PBGC, had such a 
policy been instituted in 1974. Although this strategy may be unacceptable now, it still 
remains the basis for formulating a benchmark by which to compare the PBGC’s 
investment policy.  
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 Consideration of the liability structure alone is not sufficient, given the 
uncertainty about future liabilities inherited from bankrupt plans. Instead, consideration 
can also be given to the factors that will drive future liabilities. This broader view of the 
liability structure is analogous to portfolio construction on the asset side, wherein factor 
exposure is considered. In the case of the PBGC, this means using its models to 
determine what sectors/industries are highly likely candidates for bankruptcy/plan 
termination. That information would then be used to set investment policy. For instance, 
in its current allocation both in fixed income and equities, the PBGC’s external managers 
can be told that their performance will be evaluated against some customized index. The 
customized index would take into account the potential exposure to plans in sectors that 
the PBGC might inherit. So if several firms in industry X were estimated to have a high 
probability of being taken over by the PBGC, avoiding industry X in establishing a 
benchmark for asset managers would be appropriate. This would call for the development 
of a benchmark that minimized exposure to troubled industries where the PBGC had 
identified its exposure.3  
 In fact, not only is minimizing exposure to such industries or sectors warranted: 
risk mitigation might also call for short positions in such industries. Assuming that the 
PBGC could not short the stock of such firms nor write put options on them, there are 
3 On page 38 of the PBGC’s 2012 Annual Report, the following is stated about custom 
benchmarks: “The custom benchmarks include similar securities and are weighted 
combinations of sub-sector benchmarks. PBGC is able to redeem composite assets 
upon request.” However, it unclear whether reference to a custom benchmark means 
the same type of customization suggested in this proposal. 
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more acceptable alternatives in the equity market to implement this strategy. For instance, 
exchange-traded funds (ETFs) for targeted industries/sectors could be shorted, as well as 
index put options that benefit from difficulties in an industry or sector. The decision as to 
the type of exposure (ETFs versus contingent-type positions) will depend on the 
likelihood that the PBGC project problems in an industry or sector inheriting plans from 
bankrupt firms. In the case of fixed income (bond) indices, again there can be 
customization of the benchmark to avoid troubled industries or shorting exposure can be 
obtained by taking positions in credit derivatives. 
 Learning the PBGC’s exposure to industries/sectors would this become an 
integral part of its risk management program. Currently, the PBGC indicates that:  
“Throughout the year, we conduct due diligence on our processes and the 
investment management firms. Our due diligence includes regular 
communication with the management firms, enabling us to stay updated 
on matters affecting the agency’s investment program, including the 
agency’s portfolio, the portfolio’s performance, and firm changes.” 
(PBGC 2012a: 20) 
This due diligence process would benefit from identification of aggregate exposure to 
positions driving potential future liabilities. 
 There is an implementation issue associated with this proposal, involving the 
signaling of information to the financial markets when benchmarks are established as 
described. The signaling of concerns by the PBGC could cause external managers to take 
positions in the portfolio of their other clients that could accelerate the difficulties in the 
troubled industries or sectors. Yet there is a solution to this signaling problem. Although 
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the PBGC does not manage funds internally, it should be able to hire staff that can 
employ an overall strategy so as to obtain the target exposure to an industry. To do so 
would require external managers reporting their exposure periodically to the PBGC. The 
PBGC staff would then offset this exposure with ETFs and/or derivatives and take 
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